Optimism gets mugged in the dark alley of reality. UK banks, especially the retail ones, are still in trouble.
LONDON (Reuters) - Britain's banks are likely to see their battered retail arms slide to a loss in the second half of 2009, as the cost of bad loans, tough competition and wholesale funding continues to weigh, a survey by accountants KPMG found.
"Retail banking is just profitable at lower levels, but with rising impairments. It seems probable that it will fall into loss making in the second half of this year," KMPG said in its UK Banks Performance Benchmarking Survey on Wednesday.
David Sayer, head of retail banking for KPMG's advisory practice, said he was "slightly pessimistic" about the second half, though banks' retail losses could reverse in early 2010.
"It's not a catastrophic shift, but if you are slightly pessimistic on house prices, if you believe there is a lagged effect on unemployment, and therefore you believe bad debts on credit cards and personal loans will rise, then you believe a marginal profit will become a marginal loss," he said.
Showing posts with label price-to-income ratio. Show all posts
Showing posts with label price-to-income ratio. Show all posts
Wednesday, August 26, 2009
Thursday, April 23, 2009
False choices; irrelevant counter factuals
Just before Alistair Darling finished his budget speech yesterday, he made the following supremely fatuous comment:
You can grow your way out of recession. You cannot cut your way out.
The first statement was an oxymoron. If an economy is growing, then it's not in recession. If it is in recession, then it's not growing. The second statement is just plan wrong. If an economy has a large public sector, which crowds out and weakens the private sector, then cutting public expenditure will stimulate growth.
In the mid-1980s, the Irish government provided an excellent example of the merits of public expenditure cuts as a pro-growth strategy. After a decade of appalling fiscal deficits, it introduced a highly successful expenditure reduction programme, which re-established long run fiscal sustainability, and laid the basis for 10 years of solid economic growth. In fact, the Irish experience introduced a new concept - the expansionary fiscal contraction. Of course, the Irish ruined everything by pumping up a huge and unsustainable housing bubble, but that is another story.
However, this is not my main objection to Darling's foolish play on words. He displayed the typical New Labour tactic of posing an irrelevant question in order to deflect from the root of our economic difficulties - debt. Darling wants to distract us from New Labour's continuing contribution to the UK's horrific debt levels.
Households and firms owe too much, while the banks have too many loans that are unlikely to be repaid. Rather than go through the painful process of unwinding this debt, which necessarily involves an deep recession, Darling thinks he can escape the consequences of New Labour economics. The answer, absurdly, is more debt. The public sector, he believes, can take over as the borrower of last resort, and keep the economy growing. He has co-opted the Bank of England, who have obligingly cut interest rates to almost zero.
Eighteen months into this crisis, and this strategy has failed miserably. The economy has already slipped into a nasty downturn, while unemployment is rising. Darling would no doubt argue that things would be so much worse if the government hadn't stepped in, raised borrowing and kept aggregate demand high. This brings us to the second highly dubious tool of the discredited politician - the counter factual. "Things are bad, but there would be so much worse without me."
Indeed, the situation is bad, and Darling made it worse with his reckless budget yesterday. Even under the best case scenario, New Labour has bequeathed this country a decade of historically unprecedented fiscal problems. In the worst-case scenario, the UK could be slipping towards a fiscal crisis, where financial markets question the long run solvency of the UK government and refuse to finance this profligacy.
You can grow your way out of recession. You cannot cut your way out.
The first statement was an oxymoron. If an economy is growing, then it's not in recession. If it is in recession, then it's not growing. The second statement is just plan wrong. If an economy has a large public sector, which crowds out and weakens the private sector, then cutting public expenditure will stimulate growth.
In the mid-1980s, the Irish government provided an excellent example of the merits of public expenditure cuts as a pro-growth strategy. After a decade of appalling fiscal deficits, it introduced a highly successful expenditure reduction programme, which re-established long run fiscal sustainability, and laid the basis for 10 years of solid economic growth. In fact, the Irish experience introduced a new concept - the expansionary fiscal contraction. Of course, the Irish ruined everything by pumping up a huge and unsustainable housing bubble, but that is another story.
However, this is not my main objection to Darling's foolish play on words. He displayed the typical New Labour tactic of posing an irrelevant question in order to deflect from the root of our economic difficulties - debt. Darling wants to distract us from New Labour's continuing contribution to the UK's horrific debt levels.
Households and firms owe too much, while the banks have too many loans that are unlikely to be repaid. Rather than go through the painful process of unwinding this debt, which necessarily involves an deep recession, Darling thinks he can escape the consequences of New Labour economics. The answer, absurdly, is more debt. The public sector, he believes, can take over as the borrower of last resort, and keep the economy growing. He has co-opted the Bank of England, who have obligingly cut interest rates to almost zero.
Eighteen months into this crisis, and this strategy has failed miserably. The economy has already slipped into a nasty downturn, while unemployment is rising. Darling would no doubt argue that things would be so much worse if the government hadn't stepped in, raised borrowing and kept aggregate demand high. This brings us to the second highly dubious tool of the discredited politician - the counter factual. "Things are bad, but there would be so much worse without me."
Indeed, the situation is bad, and Darling made it worse with his reckless budget yesterday. Even under the best case scenario, New Labour has bequeathed this country a decade of historically unprecedented fiscal problems. In the worst-case scenario, the UK could be slipping towards a fiscal crisis, where financial markets question the long run solvency of the UK government and refuse to finance this profligacy.
Labels:
crash,
finance,
inflation,
insolvency,
price-to-income ratio,
UK,
UK banking,
UK house prices,
UK housing
Tuesday, April 21, 2009
The end of the big LTV mortgage
Anyone who wants to buy a house today needs to come to the market with a huge deposit. A year ago, around 60 percent of mortgage products offered customers the opportunity to borrow 90 percent or more of the house price. Today, that figure is a litte over seven percent.
Labels:
bankruptcy,
crash,
money,
mortgage-equity withdrawal,
price-to-income ratio,
UK economy,
UK house prices,
UK housing,
US economy
Tuesday, March 10, 2009
Alice's bubble wrap
The Case against Twitter
Guido Fawkes takes on Twitter: "The idea that it is some kind of revolutionary form of social media interaction is laughable".
Credit cards are the next credit crunch
If you have one, cut it up right now. Get a debit card instead.
More Debt Won’t Rescue The Great American Ponzi
It won't rescue the UK Ponzi scheme, either.
Japan at 26-year low
Japanese stocks hit a 26-year low on the announcement of the country's first current account deficit in more than a decade.
Have Pensions Succumbed to Casino Capitalism?
You need to ask?
Citigroup: Posted a Profit? Surely That Can't Be
The Financial Ninji calls for a reality check on Citi.
Sell them gilts, buy them gilts, sell them gilts
The government sells debt; the Bank of England buys that debt. Doesn't the government own the Bank of England?
Where Were The Media As Wall Street Imploded?
There are plenty of people to share the blame for the collapse of the nation's financial system. Greedy speculators, mortgage executives and banking chiefs; pliant credit rating agencies; and absentee government regulators come to mind. But what about the self-described watchdogs in the media?
Hanging On, or How to Get Through a Depression and Enjoy Life
Denial might be the best strategy.
Guido Fawkes takes on Twitter: "The idea that it is some kind of revolutionary form of social media interaction is laughable".
Credit cards are the next credit crunch
If you have one, cut it up right now. Get a debit card instead.
More Debt Won’t Rescue The Great American Ponzi
It won't rescue the UK Ponzi scheme, either.
Japan at 26-year low
Japanese stocks hit a 26-year low on the announcement of the country's first current account deficit in more than a decade.
Have Pensions Succumbed to Casino Capitalism?
You need to ask?
Citigroup: Posted a Profit? Surely That Can't Be
The Financial Ninji calls for a reality check on Citi.
Sell them gilts, buy them gilts, sell them gilts
The government sells debt; the Bank of England buys that debt. Doesn't the government own the Bank of England?
Where Were The Media As Wall Street Imploded?
There are plenty of people to share the blame for the collapse of the nation's financial system. Greedy speculators, mortgage executives and banking chiefs; pliant credit rating agencies; and absentee government regulators come to mind. But what about the self-described watchdogs in the media?
Hanging On, or How to Get Through a Depression and Enjoy Life
Denial might be the best strategy.
Labels:
credit cards,
inflation,
price-to-income ratio,
UK,
UK economy,
UK house prices,
UK housing,
US housing bubble
Subscribe to:
Posts (Atom)