Syria to the Rescue? by Ralph Seliger

The following has been published simultaneously in a slightly different version at the Campaign for American Leadership in the Middle East (CALME) Online Journal. Overnight, since I wrote this piece, the world has been surprised and I’ve been shocked to learn that France has reneged on its responsibility to put its money and soldiers where its mouth was in supplying a sizable contingent to the UN international force – which it struggled mightily to create as a cornerstone of Security Council Resolution 1701. That France’s fecklessness may undermine the deployment of a strengthened UN military presence and therefore the entire structure of the cease-fire in Lebanon, reinforces my conviction in the importance of my notion about Syria. – R. Seliger

I’ve had this seemingly outlandish idea for over a month now, even before it was proposed in articles in Haaretz, Ynet and elsewhere by such leading Zionist doves as Yossi Beilin and Gershon Baskin: The one silver lining to the Lebanon war, and the best solution for Israeli security, is the renewed possibility of a peace treaty with Syria.

We should recall that Israel and Syria came close to a peace agreement two or three times in the 1990s, with the most recent failure being the breakdown of negotiations between Ehud Barak and the elder President Assad over a sliver of a few meters one way or the other at the eastern edge of the Kinneret (Sea of Galilee). This was the great failing that led to the unilateral withdrawal from southern Lebanon and its transformation into a bastion for Hezbollah aggression. Yet, later entreaties from the younger Assad for new negotiations were ignored by Prime Minister Sharon.

On July 20th, Meretz USA hosted a frequent visitor to its Manhattan headquarters, Meretz MK Avshalom (Abu) Vilan. Abu hinted at leverage on Syria in that as many as one million Syrians have been working in Lebanon’s vibrant pre-war economy; remittances to their families have been a valuable subsidy for the stagnant Syrian economy.

There is enormous strategic value for both Israel and the United States to an agreement with Syria. Israel would require an end to Syria’s role as a conduit for arms (including missiles) and money – mostly from Iran – to Hezbollah and a cutoff of all sanctuary and supply for such other violent forces as Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The United States could demand an effective sealing of Syria’s borders against further infiltration by foreign jihadis into Iraq.

Importantly, Syria would be peeled away from its deadly embrace with Iran, an unnatural alliance not truly reflecting Syria’s interest or its cultural reality. Syria is mostly Sunni, Arab and secular, whereas Iran’s regime is Shiite, Persian and theocratic.

In return, Syria would benefit from an end to the threat of military attack from Israel, the US or both. And the prospect of a new peace descending upon Lebanon, would again trigger a strengthened economy for this resourceful nation, benefitting Syria anew with jobs for Syrian workers. But such an agreement would require of the United States a sustained diplomatic engagement with the Israeli-Arab conflict that has not characterized the current Bush administration to date.

Israel’s cost for a breakthrough with Syria would be steep and obvious – the loss of the Golan Heights. But even in this, I would suggest a counter-offer that, however unlikely to be accepted by Syria, would be of mutual benefit to both countries: Israel should acknowledge Syrian sovereignty and then advance two options short of abandoning the territory outright; one would be a long-term leasing arrangement, say 50 or 99 years, with the Golan becoming a small Middle Eastern Hong Kong. The other would be to offer a return to Syrian sovereignty but negotiating to find another way for Israelis and their commercial enterprises to remain, perhaps dangling the prospect of jobs for Syrian laborers and partnerships for Syrian business people.

As has been widely noted, the approximately 15-20,000 Israelis who have made the Golan their home are not the uncompromising hardliners who constitute a prominent element of the West Bank settler population. For example, the Golan is the only area beyond the pre-1967 Green Line in which members of the left-wing and very dovish Kibbutz Artzi or National Kibbutz Federation (now merging with the United Kibbutz Movement) established new kibbutzim. Although these kibbutzniks have from the outset declared a willingness to leave their homes in return for a real peace with Syria, peace would only be strengthened if Israelis and their businesses were allowed to remain.

It is not clear that many would choose to remain under any form of Syrian rule, but this concrete fact of Israeli-Syrian co- existence would greatly improve the new post-war climate and provide a significant boost to the stagnant Syrian economy. There is no inherent reason why the highly successful Golan Heights Winery, or the ski resort at Mt. Hermon and the other enterprises of 24 factories and 28 kibbutzim and moshavim, could not benefit both Israelis and Syrians. Syria could derive benefit through taxation, rent payments (if the territory is leased), and through a spate of employment and investment opportunities for its people. And the region as a whole would fruitfully observe a new model of cooperation, for a change, between Arabs and Jews. – R. Seliger